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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic constitutional standards that the Supreme Court
of the United States has employed in evaluating the constitutionality
* © 1988 David S. Day.
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of governmental regulations of protected speech is the "incidental reg-
ulation" test.I Along with the use of the strict scrutiny test for "con-
tent" restrictions of protected speech,2 and the "time, place, and
manner" test for regulations of the physical form of protected
speech,3 the incidental regulation standard forms one of the three pil-
lars of the modern free speech doctrine. This article will explore the
historical development of the incidental regulation standard and
delineate the current status of the doctrine.
A commonly accepted starting point in free speech analysis is the
observation that the Court has adopted a "two-track" system: "con-
tent-based" and "content-neutral." ' 4 In any given case, the determina-
tion of the appropriate track depends on whether the challenged
regulation is based on the content of protected speech. Regulations
on the content-based track receive a higher level of judicial scrutiny
1. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3177-78 (1986); United States v. Al-
bertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-89 (1985); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483-84 (1975); Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban
Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communication, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 779, 783 (1985).
The text of the free speech clause of the Constitution of the United States provides:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend.
I. The free speech guarantee applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Hereinafter, the terms "protected speech" and
"protected expression" are used interchangeably. They both refer to communicative activity
that, under the free speech clause, receives some form of heightened judicial protection against
governmental regulation greater than the rational basis test. For a discussion of the rational
basis test, see City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496
(1986).
In addition, the terms "test" and "standard" are synonyms when referring to the
expressed criteria employed by the Court in determining the constitutionality of a
governmental regulation. Finally, the terms "regulation" and "restriction" are used
interchangeably to refer to the type of abridgments of free speech interests that governmental
authorities employ in various contexts. The term "regulation" is used in a broad sense to
include any of "the various other formulae for the repression of expression." New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
2. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); see Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987).
3. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981);
see Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time,
Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 758 (1986).
4. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.04 (1984); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-92 (2d ed. 1988); Perry, Freedom of Expression: An
Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1137, 1185 (1983); Stone, supra note 2, at
54. Content restrictions are "regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the
basis of its content." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986). On the
content-based track, governmental regulations are subject to intensive scrutiny. On the
content-neutral track, courts employ a lower level of judicial review. See id. at 48, 54.
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than those on the content-neutral track.5 The Court traditionally has
implemented the incidental regulation test on the content-neutral
track.6
The significance of the incidental regulation doctrine can be
determined only by reference to the other standards the Court has
employed in free speech cases.7 Because the incidental regulation
standard must be viewed in relation to both the other lower track tests
and the heightened scrutiny of the higher track, a brief overview of
these standards is appropriate. In addition, because the Court has
utilized overlapping concepts, the development of various tests on the
content-based track may provide insights into the status of the inci-
dental regulation standard.
A. The Higher Track: Content Regulation
On the content-based track, the Court has established that cer-
5. See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 46-47; L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 791-92; Stone,
supra note 2, at 48, 54.
6. Although commentators and Justices of the Supreme Court have criticized this two-
tier form of analysis, a full critique of the conventional wisdom of the two-track model is
beyond the scope of this article. For a range of commentary, see Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); and Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 142 (1981).
An implicit criticism of the two-track system is found in the Court's recent use of the
public forum doctrine to decide, in whole or in part, first amendment cases. See Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805-06 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). For purposes of this article, the
public forum doctrine is merely an exception to a generally applicable regulation. Schauer,
supra note 1, at 789; see L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 981-82. Given this view, which is
admittedly inconsistent with a broad reading of Cornelius and Perry, the public forum doctrine
will not be discussed in this article. See generally Dienes, The Trashing ofthe Public Forum:
Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986) (Recent
decisions have converted the original public forum concept into a "device for denying open
and equal access."); Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis.
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1265 (1984)
(The public forum doctrine "fails to illuminate the true problem at hand."); Perry, supra note
4, at 1205 (The Court's use of the public forum doctrine "simply makes no sense.").
Although an extended discussion of the criticism of the two-track system would not be
appropriate here, it should be noted that the standards of the two-track model should be
aligned so that content regulations and time, place, and manner (TPM) regulations are
grouped together and receive appropriate heightened scrutiny. In contrast to incidental
regulations, both content and time, place, and manner regulations share the common factor
that they are purposeful governmental regulations. See Day, The Hybridization ofthe Content-
Neutral Standardsfor the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 195-211, 211 n.94 (1987).
7. See Stone, supra note 2, at 52. The use of standards is a significant, if often
unarticulated, aspect of constitutional analysis. In contrast to ad hoc balancing, the use of
standards permits some level of predictability and accountability regarding judicial
decisionmaking. Cf Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 659, 662 (1978) (offering a "systematic analysis" of political boycotts, as opposed to the
traditional ad hoc balancing test).
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tain categories of expression are not protected with any heightened
level of judicial review.' For example, the government may restrict
speech that the trier of fact categorizes as "obscenity" 9 or "child por-
nography,"' 0 as long as there is a rational basis for the restriction.
Yet these definitional exclusions are not static. Even though the
Court previously excluded commercial speech and defamatory speech
from protected status on the basis of cont:ent, it later afforded these
forms of speech a measure of protection greater than the rational basis
test." In essence, the Court has employed an ad hoc balancing test
rather than any of the standards utilized on one of the tracks.
Even if a category of expression is not definitionally excluded
from protection, the government may attempt to regulate speech
based on its content. Under traditional free speech standards, the
government has a heavy burden of justification in such instances, both
substantively and procedurally.' 2 In fact, governmental regulation of
the content of protected speech must normally satisfy the strict scru-
tiny test.'3 Under this test, the conventional presumption of constitu-
tionality is suspended, and the government has the burden of showing
that both the content regulation serves a compelling state interest, and
8. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 832; Schauer, supra note 1, at 785 n.24; Stone, supra
note 2, at 47. The test applicable to a regulation of speech that falls within one of the
categorical exclusions is usually the familiar rational basis test. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at
832.
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
10. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (Fighting words, among other things, are not protected by the federal
Constitution.).
11. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech receives
limited constitutional protection); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (same); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964) ("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations."); see L.
TRIBE, supra note 4, at 890-904.
12. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 & n.7 (1981) (subject matter restriction); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (procedural protection); see Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 217 (1984). For purposes of this article,
content regulations include both viewpoint and subject matter restrictions. I have adopted
what Professor Baker has called the "broader version of the content neutrality requirement."
Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937, 959 (1983); see Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that Government has no
power to restrict expression because of ... its subject matter, or its content.").
Governmental efforts to punish advocacy constitute one type of content regulation. The
Court subjects such regulations to the very highest level of judicial scrutiny currently
employed under the free speech clause: the modern "clear and present danger" test.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
13. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270; see Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96; see also Stone, supra note 2, at
73 (discussing the rationale for the use of strict scrutiny).
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the regulatory means chosen are the least restrictive ones available to
further that interest.' 4
B. The Lower Track.- Content-Neutral Regulation
Outside of the area of content regulation, however, the Court has
routinely applied lower levels of judicial protection.15 On the content-
neutral track, the Court has employed two judicially created stan-
dards: The time, place, and manner (TPM) test, and the incidental
regulation test. A preliminary review of the content-neutral track is
appropriate as background for an analysis of the incidental regulation
standard.
1. LOWER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Both types of content-neutral regulations are tested by judicial
standards that are less rigorous than the strict scrutiny test applicable
to content regulations.' 6 Even though the Court has recently implied
that the two standards have merged into a single, hybrid test,'" the
TPM test and the incidental regulation test have traditionally been
separate and distinct from one another.' 8
At least in part, different constitutional policy considerations
underlie the separate tests. The dominant policy consideration
reflected in the TPM test is the need to determine whether regulations
that supposedly are limited to only the physical form of protected
speech actually are directed towards the content of the speech. 19 In
14. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583
n.6 (1983); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786
(1978).
15. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985) (incidental regulation test);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 517 n.23 (1981) (opinion of White, J.)
(time, place, and manner test); Stone, supra note 2, at 48, 54. Dean Stone argues that the
Court has utilized "three distinct standards" on the content-neutral track, rather than the two
presented herein. Id. at 50. There can be no doubt that the Court's analysis of content-neutral
restrictions is inconsistent and confusing. Moreover, the Court's analysis is hardly static. The
important point is that the level of protection for free speech interests has deteriorated. See
Schauer, supra note 1, at 787.
16. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688-89 (incidental regulation test); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at
517 n.23 (opinion of White, J.) (TPM test).
This article proceeds on the assumption that the Court will apply the incidental regulation
test when the government chooses to defend a challenged regulation by asserting that it is
merely an incidental regulation. Similarly, the Court's use of the TPM test will be determined
primarily by the government's asserted defense.
17. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986); Posadas De Puerto
Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2979 n.9 (1986).
18. See Day, supra note 6, at 197; Schauer, supra note 1, at 785; Stone, supra note 2, at 99.
19. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977); Day, supra note 6, at 200.
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contrast, the primary policy consideration underlying the incidental
regulation test is the concern for the overreaching effect of govern-
mental restrictions that have an adverse impact on protected expres-
sion, even though the intent of the regulations was to regulate
noncommunicative conduct only.2 0 Although the tests may embody
overlapping policy concerns, the significant distinction between the
tests originally developed from the judicial perception that, of the two
standards, only the government's use of a TPM regulation involved a
deliberate effort to restrict expression. z In other words, although a
TPM regulation is established for the purpose of abridging protected
expression, an incidental regulation is a nonpurposeful abridgment.
2. THE TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER DOCTRINE: NEUTRAL BUT
PURPOSEFUL ABRIDGMENTS OF THE FORM OF EXPRESSION
The TPM doctrine originated in a series of cases decided in the
late 1930's and early 1940's.22 The developing doctrine reached the
point of independent status in the so-called "loud speaker" cases of
the late 1940's.23 In Kovacs v. Cooper,24 for example, although the
Court did not fully delineate the doctrine, it upheld the application of
a facially neutral ordinance regulating the broadcasting of political
messages by sound trucks.25
Over thirty years later, in Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness,26 the Court announced the modern TPM doc-
trine. In Heffron, the International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness (ISKCON) brought an action against the Minnesota Agricultural
Society, the operator of the annual Minnesota state fair.27 The Min-
nesota Agricultural Society had promulgated a regulation that con-
fined sales, distribution, and solicitation activities to certain "fixed"
booths.28 ISKCON challenged this regulation under the first amend-
ment because the Krishna religion required its followers to sell litera-
ture and solicit donations from passers-by on a peripatetic, face-to-
20. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Comment, G. & A. Books, Inc.
v. Stern: Relevance of Improper Motive to First Amendment Incidental Infringement Claims,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 272, 280 (1986).
21. See Day, supra note 6, at 211; Stone, supra note 2, at 99.
22. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 575-76 (1941); Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in
the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 175, 205 (1983).
23. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562
(1948).
24. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
25. Id. at 87.
26. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
27. Id. at 643-44.
28. Id. at 644.
[Vol. 42:491
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face basis.29 The state responded by arguing that the regulation was a
content-neutral place restriction.3 ° The Court upheld the regulation 3
and identified the three prongs of the modern TPM test: First,
whether the regulation was content-neutral; second, whether the regu-
lation was justified by a "significant governmental interest;" and
third, whether the regulation preserved "ample alternative channels"
for the expression of the interest.32
Two years after the Heffron decision, the Court moved from fair-
grounds to sidewalks. In United States v. Grace,33 a protester sought
to distribute leaflets that advocated the removal of unfit judges, and
another protester displayed a sign on which she had placed "the ver-
batim text of the First Amendment."34 Although these actions
involved clearly protected speech, they occurred on the sidewalk in
front of the Supreme Court, and therefore were prohibited under a
federal statute regulating activity on the grounds of the Supreme
Court building.35 After law enforcement authorities prevented the
protesters from demonstrating, the protesters challenged the statute.36
Although the government defended the statute as a place regulation,3"
the Court, recognizing that the sidewalks outside the Supreme Court
building were traditionally open to the public, held that the govern-
ment failed to justify the significant governmental interest prong of
the TPM test, and overturned the federal statute.38
This brief history of the TPM doctrine demonstrates that the
modern TPM test generally provides a lower level of judicial scrutiny
of content-neutral regulations prohibiting protected speech than the
high level of scrutiny of content regulations.39 The Court has recog-
nized, however, that the government, through so-called TPM regula-
29. Id. at 644-45. The practice is called "Sankirtan." Id. at 645.
30. Id. at 646, 648.
31. Id. at 655.
32. Id. at 647-48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)); see Note, Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expressive
Activities in the Public Forum, 61 NEB. L. REV. 167, 181-82 (1982). In subsequent decisions,
the Court has delineated a fourth prong, an explicit means test. See City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984); Day, supra note 6, at 202.
33. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
34. Id. at 173-74.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 174.
37. Id. at 180.
38. Id. at 182-83.
39. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 107 S. Ct. 919, 920 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting) (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 517 n.23 (1981)
(opinion of White, J.)); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984); Goldberger, supra note
22, at 205.
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tions, is deliberately attempting to restrain protected speech.4" It
appears that, because of a recognition that governmental regulators
may not proceed in a completely neutral manner with respect to the
suppression of free expression, the Court has maintained the relatively
vigorous TPM test.4 The Court's modern TPM doctrine contem-
plates, therefore, that judicial review of such governmental conduct
must guard against the prospect that the purportedly neutral regula-
tions are merely pretexts for content regulations.42
The Court demonstrated its concern for, and awareness of, such
pretense in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict.43 Three public school students wore black armbands to their
schools as a protest against the Vietnam War. By wearing the arm-
bands, they violated the school board's prohibition on armbands,
which the board had adopted upon learning of the students' plan of
protest.44 Pursuant to its new policy, the board suspended the stu-
dents.45 The district court upheld the constitutionality of the prohibi-
tion on the ground that it was merely a place regulation.46
In analyzing the place justification, the Tinker Court recognized
that the school board previously had permitted students to wear vari-
ous political and ideological insignia, including swastikas.4" Under
these circumstances, the Court determined that the actual purpose
40. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 4.52 U.S. 61, 65 (1981); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977). See generally Perry, supra note 4, at 1185 (censorial
versus noncensorial restrictions); Schauer, supra note 1, at 785 (intended versus unintended
restrictions); Stone, supra note 2, at 99 (communicative versus noncommunicative
restrictions).
41. Cf Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Goldberger, supra note 22, at 208.
42. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981); Schad, 452 U.S. at 65, 72; see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 (opinion of White, J.);
Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93 (The city was "not genuinely concerned with the place of the
speech."). The term "pretext" connotes, at a minimum, a lack of sincerity. See Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813-14 (1985) (Blackmun & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting). A pretextual justification arises when the government attempts to justify a
regulation as content-neutral "under the guise of preserving" some important governmental
interest. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4. Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (dictum discussing congressional action "under the pretext of
executing its powers"). The concern for pretense makes the TPM doctrine analytically similar
to the doctrine employed for content regulation.
43. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
44. Id. at 504. Because of the armbands, this was clearly symbolic speech. Yet the Court
did not use the O'Brien standard. Tinker, consequently, refutes the conventional wisdom that
all symbolic speech cases are resolved under the incidental regulation test. See Schad, 452 U.S.
at 65, 72 (nude dancing protected as symbolic speech under the TPM standard).
45. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
46. Id. at 504-05; see L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 794 n.4.
47. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510.
[Vol. 42:491
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behind the board's armband prohibition was to regulate protected
speech on the basis of the students' antiwar position.48 The Court
properly concluded, therefore, that the alleged place regulation was a
pretext for content regulation.49
Under a traditional analysis, the purposeful nature of TPM regu-
lations distinguishes them from incidental regulations."0 Before ex-
amining the history of the incidental regulation standard, however, a
brief overview of its policy basis provides an appropriate context.
3. THE INCIDENTAL REGULATION OF FREE SPEECH
The Court has applied the incidental regulation standard to gov-
ernmental regulations that are directed towards nonspeech behavior,
but that have an adverse impact on protected speech." The inciden-
tal regulation doctrine protects "expressive conduct," as opposed to
"ordinary noncommunicative conduct. ' 52 The Court developed the
doctrine in order to evaluate alleged abridgments of protected expres-
sion that arise from the effect of a generally applicable regulation of
nonexpressive conduct.5 3 Even if the effect on protected speech is
severe, the adverse impact for such regulations is considered inciden-
tal because it is nonpurposeful.54
With respect to such incidental regulations, the Court has tradi-
48. Id. at 510-11.
49. Id.; see Ely, supra note 1, at 1498 n.62; see also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
106 S. Ct. 3159, 3163 (1986) (suggesting that Tinker was a more narrow, viewpoint dis-
crimination decision). The Fraser Court appears to have ignored Professor Ely's observation
that reading Tinker as merely a viewpoint discrimination decision "is as irrelevant as it is
unintelligible." Ely, supra note 1, at 1498.
50. See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 201 (1986); Day, supra note 6, at 207.
Professor Quadres has argued that the TPM standard is more protective of speech than the
O'Brien standard. See Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the
Aesthetic State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 439, 449 n.51 (1986).
In contrast, a student commentator has argued that the O'Brien standard provides greater
protection for free speech interests than the TPM test. See Note, The Two-Track Model of
First Amendment Adjudication After Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,
62 B.U.L. REV. 215, 233 (1982). It is important, nevertheless, to recognize that the standards
are distinct.
The incidental regulation test reflects a judicial concern for sham justifications. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). To that extent,
the incidental regulation test shares a policy concern with the TPM standard. Although the
incidental regulation test obviously embodies several policy concerns, its primary focus is on
good faith governmental regulations that affect protected speech. See id. at 376.
51. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376; Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,
85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1008 n.36 (1976); P. Baum & M. Stern, An Analysis of Legislation
Directed at the Closing of P.L.O. Offices in the United States 9 (June 1987).
52. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 50, at 287 n.40.
53. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1985); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
54. See Day, supra note 6, at 209-10.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tionally identified two primary issues. The first issue is whether the
conduct in question is actually protected. 5 Historically, various
types of "symbolic speech," such as walking, marching, sitting, sit-
ting-in, and even sleeping, have received protection. 6 Assuming that
it is protected, the Court would then address the second issue: What
level of protection is appropriate?5" This article examines the latter
issue.
Because the Court has applied the incidental regulation test
outside of the context of symbolic speech, the symbolic speech issue
has lost much of its jurisprudential significance.5 The application of
the incidental regulation test outside of the context of symbolic speech
indicates that the operational rationale for the doctrine focuses on the
type of regulation, as opposed to the type of speech-related conduct.59
In a nation whose history can be traced to such symbolic conduct as a
"tea party," it is appropriate for the focus of the doctrine to be on the
type and purpose of the governmental action. The question, there-
fore, is not whether the particular speech is worth protecting, but
whether the government has a sufficient justification for its attempts
to restrict the expressive interests.6"
Indeed, the incidental regulation doctrine focuses on restraining
governmental conduct, rather than on enhancing the quality or quan-
tity of the speech involved.6' Thus, the doctrine plays an important
role in free speech jurisprudence. As the following historical discus-
sion demonstrates, this role has been, at times, controversial and
colorful.
55. See Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
467, 468 (1984). The Court has almost completely abandoned the analytically unworkable
"speech versus conduct" distinction. See Stone, supra note 2, at 80 n. 141. Yet the first issue-
whether the conduct is actually protected-has proven to be problematic for courts. See Note,
supra at 468. Indeed, the Court's analysis often ended with this issue.
56. See Note, supra note 55, at 468.
57. Id.
58. Schauer, supra note 1, at 785 & n.22.
59. See id. at 782-83; Note, supra note 7, at 671.
60. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 786. Commentators recently have emphasized that
focusing on the "nature of government regulation" rather than the "values that are served by
speech" may influence free speech analysis. E.g., id. at 783; accord L. BOLLINGER, supra note
50, at 77-92. Dean Bollinger certainly provides a helpful insight when he asserts that citizens,
as opposed to "officialdom alone," provide a real threat to freedom of speech. L. BOLLINGER,
supra note 50, at 80. The Court, however, should impose appropriate protection for free
speech interests without regard to the source of the threat.
61. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 50, at 205-08; Schauer, supra note 1, at 786.
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCIDENTAL
REGULATION STANDARD 
I
Although the incidental regulation standard originated with the
seminal decision of United States v. O'Brien,62 several pre-O'Brien
decisions had some bearing on the development of the standard.
63
A. The Pre- O'Brien Cases
The pre-O'Brien case law provided, at best, an uncertain level of
protection for free speech interests. Although the Court did not artic-
ulate a test, it identified the appropriate perspective on the question of
what is to be the level of protection afforded free speech interests.64
Because the cases of Stromberg v. California65 and Thomas v. Col-
lins 66 illustrate the uncertain level of protection, as well as the devel-
opment of the "preferred position" of free speech interests, 67 this
discussion will be limited to these decisions.
The Stromberg Court was faced with an early sample of what
would later be called "symbolic speech." The defendant was a mem-
ber of, and summer camp counselor for, the Young Communist
League. Her responsibility as a counselor included raising a red flag
as part of a daily ceremony for children attending camp.68 She was
convicted of violating a California criminal statute that prohibited the
displaying of a "red flag, banner or badge ... in any public place."
69
Although the lower court overruled the defendant's demurrer,7 ° the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed.7'
The Court did not carefully apply particularized free speech
standards in its analysis. Rather, it relied upon a sweeping generaliza-
tion: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discus-
sion . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."'7 2
Ultimately relying on the void for vagueness doctrine, the Court held
62. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
63. These decisions are important for their illustrative value. They are also important to
the doctrine because the O'Brien Court cited them as purported authority for the an-
nouncement of the incidental regulation standard. Id. at 377, 382.
64. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
65. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
66. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
67. For a discussion of the Burger Court's treatment of the preferred position doctrine, see
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 441-43
(1980).
68. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 362.
69. Id. at 361.
70. Id. The appellate court affirmed. Id.
71. Id. at 370.
72. Id. at 369.
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that the California statute was "so vague and indefinite" that it vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment.73
In its own context, the Stromberg decision was actually a
remarkable development in which the Court used judicial review to
protect highly unpopular points of view.14 It is important to note,
however, that the Court's use of the vagueness doctrine provided an
amorphous level of protection. After Stromberg, it would be
extremely difficult to predict with any certainty how another inciden-
tal regulation case might be decided.
Perhaps the uncertainty left by Stromberg is best evidenced by
Thomas v. Collins." The Thomas Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed
the contempt citation of a union organizer.7 6 The defendant was the
president of the United Auto Workers Union, and planned to give a
speech at a union rally in Texas. He did not have an "organizer's
card," however, which was required of all union organizers by a
Texas statute.77 When the Texas state authorities learned that Collins
was going to be in Texas, they successfully sought an ex parte tempo-
rary restraining order against the defendant's speech. 8 Although the
defendant had received notice of the order six hours before his
appearance at the rally, he gave the speech. 79 A Texas court subse-
quently held him in contempt.8 0
The state argued before the Supreme Court of the United States
that, because "the statute [was] directed at business practices, like
selling insurance, '81 the applicable constitutional standard is the
"'rational basis' test."'8 2 Rejecting this argument, the Court held that
the applicable standard is stricter than a rational basis test. 3 Using
this higher standard, the Court determined that the temporary
73. Id. Judge Wright, in his otherwise insightful and persuasive article, argues that
Stromberg represents an instance of viewpoint discrimination. See Wright, supra note 51,
at 1008 n.36. Even if this interpretation were correct, however, it is significant that the Court
employed the void for vagueness doctrine. Thus, Stromberg does not provide much support
for Judge Wright's assertion that the incidental regulation standard is limited to regulations
that discriminate on the basis of a particular viewpoint. See id. Indeed, the Court has applied
the incidental regulation standard to regulations that adversely affect the subject matter of
protected expression, as well as viewpoints. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974).
74. See Foster, The 1931 Personal Liberties Cases, 9 N.Y.U. L. REV. 64, 65-66 (1931).
75. 323 U.S. 546 (1945).
76. Id. at 543.
77. Id. at 518.
78. Id. at 518, 521.
79. Id. at 521.
80. Id. at 518.
81. Id. at 526.
82. Id. at 527.
83. Id. at 530.
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restraining order issued under the Texas statute violated the first
amendment.84
As in Stromberg, the Thomas Court's analysis is not completely
discernible. The Court appeared to engage in ad hoc balancing.85
Perhaps for the first time, however, the balancing in the context of a
free speech case was explicitly governed by a different presumption
than that which would attach under the rational basis standard.86
The Thomas Court determined that "the usual presumption support-
ing legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme
to the ...indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment. ' 87 Given the preferred place of such first amendment
freedoms, the Court suspended the usual presumption of constitution-
ality, and placed the burden of persuasion on the government.88 In
that regard, the Thomas Court's reasoning is significant to the subse-
quent development of the incidental regulation test, as well as the
development of the entire range of free speech issues.89
Although the pre-O'Brien cases involved some fascinating factual
circumstances and questionable governmental efforts to limit the exer-
cise of speech interests, the Court did not provide a clearly articulated
constitutional standard. In the absence of such a standard, the speech
interests remained vulnerable. The uncertainty was, by itself, a chil-
ling factor for free speech. 90
B. The Seminal Decision: United States v. O'Brien
The fundamental decision in the history of the incidental regula-
tion doctrine was United States v. O'Brien.9' The defendant, O'Brien,
and several of his colleagues ceremonially burned their draft cards on
the steps of a municipal building in Boston, with the intent to commu-
nicate opposition to the Vietnam War.92 O'Brien was later convicted
of violating the 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act, which,
among other things, required that all registrants have their draft card
in their possession.93 Specifically, the trial court found that he vio-
84. Id. at 537.
85. See id. at 530-32.
86. Id. at 529-30.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Emerson, supra note 67, at 441.
90. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1038 (In areas in which the Court has not been able to
formulate a rule under the first amendment, it has "been forced to swallow laws whole or
invalidate them in their entirety.").
91. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. Id. at 369-70.
93. Id. at 370-71.
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lated the provision that prohibited an individual from "willfully and
knowingly" destroying a draft card.94 Although the First Circuit
affirmed the conviction and remanded the case for resentencing, 95 it
held that the 1965 amendment amounted to an unconstitutional
abridgment of protected speech. 96 The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, upheld the statute.9
7
As noted above, the O'Brien Court had little precedential gui-
dance in terms of doctrinal background. Nevertheless, the Court
quickly dispensed with the question of whether protected speech
existed, resting on the assumption that O'Brien's conduct constituted
protected expression.98 The primary question for the O'Brien Court
was the constitutionality of the 1965 amendment as applied to the
particular act of destroying the draft card.
The O'Brien Court premised its analysis on its understanding of
the governmental purpose underlying the 1965 amendment. The
Court presumed that the challenged amendment was adopted in an
effort to regulate nonspeech conduct.9 9 It also presumed that, despite
the absence of a purposeful effort to restrict protected expression, the
amendment had had an adverse effect on protected expression such as
O'Brien's."° Recognizing this convergence of circumstances, the
Court examined this conduct regulation with a test significantly more
rigorous than the rational basis test.'' Indeed, in announcing what
would later become known as the incidental regulation test, the
O'Brien Court held that, in order to sustain a governmental regulation
against a free speech challenge, the government must show that, first,
the regulation "is within the Constitutional power of the Govern-
ment"; second, the governmental interest is "unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression"; third, the regulation furthers a "substantial
governmental interest"; and fourth, the regulation is "no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'' 0 2
It is apparent that the Court has used the incidental regulation
94. Id. at 370.
95. Id. at 371 & n.6.
96. Id. at 371; O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541-42 (1st Cir. 1967).
97. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 372.
98. Id. at 376.
99. Id. at 375.
100. Id. at 376-77. The Court merely assumed that O'Brien's conduct was protected. Id.
at 376.
101. Id. at 377; see United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). Through the use of
this test, the Court indicated that it would focus on the nature of the asserted governmental
interest in the regulation. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 37; Note, supra note 7, at 671-72.
102. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The order of the four prongs of the incidental regulation test
has been reorganized for analytical reasons that will be developed more fully in the text. For a
summary of the analysis of these prongs, see infra text accompanying notes 314-36.
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test to focus on those alleged abridgments of protected expression that
arise from the effect of the generally applicable regulations of non-
protected conduct. Even when the effect on protected speech was
dramatic, °3 the adverse impact of such regulations was nonpur-
poseful, and was therefore considered incidental. °4
The four prongs of the O'Brien standard are distinct from, but
easily comparable to, the elements of tests that the Court has applied
to content or TPM regulations. The constitutional power prong was
primarily an examination, under due process standards, of the govern-
ment's ability to regulate in the area. 105 The function of the unrelat-
edness prong, like the content-neutrality prong of the TPM test, was
to confirm that the challenged regulation was enacted for purposes
independent of regulating the content of protected expression.106
Analogous to the compelling interest subtest, the substantial govern-
mental interest prong evaluated the quality of the governmental inter-
est asserted on behalf of the regulation.0 7 The no greater than
essential prong, like the least restrictive alternative analysis in a strict
scrutiny test, was a means criterion. 1° 8
Although commentators have criticized the O'Brien Court,0 9
there was, until quite recently, nearly universal agreement that the
O'Brien test was an appropriate standard for judicial review of non-
speech governmental regulations." 0 In the two decades since
O'Brien, the Court has applied the test frequently;" yet it has
changed the test incrementally, and correspondingly, has limited the
protection of free speech interests.
103. O'Brien's jail term is an example of a "dramatic" effect on protected speech. See
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369 n.2.
104. For a discussion of the distinction between purposeful and incidental restrictions of
speech, see Schauer, supra note 1, at 782; Day, supra note 6, at 209-10.
105. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
106. Id. at 385-86.
107. See id. at 381 ("vital interest in having a system for raising armies").
108. See id. at 382 ("an appropriately narrow means"). Any means test is a test of the
sincerity of the government's asserted purpose. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 295 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 469 (1969).
109. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 982-83; Stone, supra note 2, at 110-11; see also Redish,
supra note 6, at 149 (stating that "O'Brien illustrates how defining the relevant governmental
interest can alter the mode of analysis").
110. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3179 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 113-305. The decision whether to categorize a
decision as an incidental regulation case was based, for present purposes, on an assessment of
the significance of the issue to the Court's ultimate decision. Basically, this article discusses
cases in which the Court considered the government's argument that the challenged restriction
was a nonpurposeful regulation of noncommunicative conduct.
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III. THE POST-O'BRIEN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INCIDENTAL REGULATION DOCTRINE
In each of the post-O'Brien decisions discussed below, the Court
has either concluded or assumed that the activity in question is
protected. " 2 Concentration on this set of decisions permits the devel-
opment of an understanding of the status of the incidental regulation
doctrine. Taken together, these decisions demonstrate an eroding
judicial commitment to free speech values.
A. Procunier v. Martinez
After the O'Brien decision, one of the earliest applications of the
incidental regulation standard was in Procunier v. Martinez., 3 In
Procunier, a class of inmates in a California prison challenged the
prison's policy regarding mail censorship." 4 The Court, in a unani-
mous decision, determined that the critical issue in the case was "the
appropriate standard of review., '" 5 To address that issue, the Court
examined "decisions ... dealing with the general problem of inciden-
tal restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance
of legitimate governmental activities.""II6 Following this review, the
Procunier Court applied the test from O'Brien.'
The Procunier Court placed the burden on the government to
show that its mail censorship regulations furthered an "important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression.,,8 The substantial state interest was security and safety
in the prison setting. 1'9 Because this was an "interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression,"' 120 the Court determined that the govern-
ment satisfied three of the four prongs.'M The Court concluded, how-
ever, that the government had "failed to show that these broad
112. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
This article does not address the issue of whether certain conduct should be given protected
status.
113. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
114. Id. at 398. The plaintiffs also challenged a regulation banning attorney-client
interviews by law students and legal paraprofessionals, but that claim is not germane to this
discussion. See id.
115. Id. at 406.
116. Id. at 409.
117. Id. at 412-14; see Comment, Backwash Benefits for Second Class Citizens: Prisoners'
First Amendment and Procedural Due Process Rights, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 402 n. 11
(1975); Note, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 178 (1974).
118. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 413-16. But cf Comment, supra note 117, at 401 (purpose in Procunier was
censorial, thus the O'Brien test was inappropriate). Apparently, the Court presumed the
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restrictions were . . . necessary," '122 and therefore held that the mail
censorship regulations were unconstitutional.'23 In its first applica-
tion of the incidental regulation standard, the Court indicated that the
means prong of the O'Brien test was more rigorous than a mere
rational basis inquiry.
B. The Young v. American Mini Theatres Concurrence
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young v. American Mini
Theatres '24 marked the next significant development in the evolution
of the incidental regulation doctrine. The city of Detroit had passed a
zoning ordinance requiring the dispersion of adult motion picture the-
aters. 25 Two theater owners challenged its constitutionality. 126 Jus-
tice Powell, apparently casting the swing vote, based his decision on
the determination that the ordinance "implicat[ed] First Amendment
concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent."' 127
Justice Powell first determined that the "Anti-Skid Row Ordi-
nance" did not have the effect of suppressing expression. 128 He con-
cluded that, under the circumstances, the appropriate test was the
O'Brien test,' 29 and consequently found that its prongs were met. 3 °f Although the satisfaction of the means prong of the O'Brien test
satisfaction of the first prong, not even mentioning it in its application of the O'Brien test. For
a discussion of this prong, see infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
122. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 415. Procunier is doctrinally important because it offered a
definition of the means prong: The means "must be generally necessary to protect one or more
•.. legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 414. The Court, however, subsequently limited
this interpretation. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); infra text accom-
panying notes 263-78.
123. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 416; see Note, supra note 117, at 180. The Procunier Court held
that a governmental restriction failed to satisfy the incidental regulation test. Procunier, 416
U.S. at 416. To the extent that Procunier is considered to be one of the O'Brien progeny, it
remains as a refutation of Professor Stone's assertion that "[the O'Brien standard] has never
resulted in the invalidation of an incidental restriction of speech." Stone, supra note 2, at 110-
11.
124. 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of American Mini
Theatres, see Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected
Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321, 351 (1977); and Note, Equal Protection and the First
Amendment. Zoning Away Skid Row, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713 (1977).
125. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 52.
126. Id. at 55.
127. Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring); see Recent Case, 42 Mo. L. REV. 461, 467 (1977).
128. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 77 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell had
concluded that the "impact of the ordinance ... is incidental and minimal." Id. at 78.
129. Id. at 79; see Case Comment, Ordinance Banning "For Sale" Signs Violates First
Amendment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 258, 261 n.32.
130. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell found
the government's interest in zoning to be "both important and substantial." Id. He also
concluded that the purposes underlying the ordinance were "unrelated to any suppression of
free expression." Id. at 80-81. In this regard, Justice Powell emphasized that "an intent or
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was the primary issue that Justice Powell addressed in his concur-
rence, the doctrinal significance of his opinion may be its analysis of
the unrelatedness prong, which had not yet been defined.' Justice
Powell, in a footnote, stated that "an intent or purpose to restrict the
communication itself because of its nature would make the O'Brien
test inapplicable."' 13 2 In this fashion, Justice Powell demonstrated
that the unrelatedness prong is essentially an examination of the
underlying purpose or motive that animated the governmental
action.'33 Justice Powell's analysis also suggested that the unrelated-
ness prong serves as a threshold for the other prongs, and therefore,
for the application of the incidental regulation standard.'34
C. Buckley v. Valeo
Decided in the same year as American Mini Theatres, the Court
in Buckley v. Valeo "I also addressed the threshold role of the unrelat-
edness prong in the incidental regulation standard. In Buckley, the
Court confronted various provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974, which, in response to the perceived
problems of excessive campaign spending and the Watergate era, rep-
resented the congressional limitations on political campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures.' 36  The court of appeals considered the
regulation of contributions and expenditures an incidental regulation
of free expression, and relied upon O'Brien to uphold the Act.'37
In reversing, the Supreme Court of the United States first deter-
purpose to restrict the communication itself because of its nature would make the O'Brien test
inapplicable." Id. at 81 n.4.
As in Procunier, the most salient issue in Justice Powell's concurrence appeared to be the
means prong. See id. at 81-82. Justice Powell's evaluation of the dispersion program led him
to conclude that "the degree of incidental encroachment ... was the minimum necessary." Id.
at 81. Hence, Justice Powell concluded that this ordinance was "not greater than necessary."
Id. at 81-82.
Justice Powell's opinion was clearly hedged by various qualifications. He was forced to
distinguish the earlier case of Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), stating
that he recognized the "possibility of using the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing
expression." American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 84 (Powell, J., concurring). Because he
found that no such pretext was involved in this case, he agreed with the majority that the
ordinance survived the constitutional challenge. Id.
131. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. See id; see also Note, supra note 7, at 673 (The question posed by the unrelatedness
prong is "whether a contested statute is motivated by a desire to regulate speech.").
134. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
135. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
136. 424 U.S. at 6-7.
137. Id. at 15-16; see Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323, 333 n.43.
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mined that the Act was "aimed in part at equalizing the relative abil-
ity of all voters to affect electoral outcomes."' 138  Under these
circumstances, the Court found that the congressional purpose was an
"interest in regulating" that "'[arose] in some measure because the
communication allegedly integral to the conduct [was] itself thought
to be harmful.' "19 In addition to the integral communicative nature
of the conduct, the Court noted that the regulation of contributions
"could have a severe impact on political dialogue."'" In this fashion,
the Buckley Court concluded that, because the Act was aimed at con-
trolling money in the political process, and because money was inevi-
tably related to speech, the threshold for applying the O'Brien test
was not present.141 It found O'Brien to be "inapposite, for money is a
neutral element not always associated with speech but a necessary and
integral part of many, perhaps most, forms of communication."' 42
Thus, the regulation in Buckley failed the unrelatedness prong of the
incidental regulation standard.
For present purposes, the Buckley decision is significant because
it identified two issues regarding the unrelatedness prong that courts
must address before examining the validity of the contested regula-
tion. First, courts must determine that the purposes underlying the
challenged regulation are aimed at nonspeech behavior rather than
speech behavior.'43 Second, courts must determine that these non-
speech purposes are genuinely unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.'41
138. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17; see Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo" The Special Nature of Political
Speech, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 24-25.
139. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968));
see Polsby, supra note 138, at 25.
140. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id. at 65 n.76. Since the Court's conclusion in Buckley, at least one commentator has
concluded that Buckley was not an incidental regulation doctrine decision. See Post, The
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 169, 194 n.10. This
article includes Buckley within the incidental regulation doctrine, as did the court of appeals,
because, even if the incidental regulation test was not satisfied, the Court applied it. See
Wright, supra note 51, at 1008. Judge Wright has presented a persuasive critique of the
Buckley majority's analysis. He would apply the O'Brien standard because the Act regulated
"the excessive use of money as a blight on the political process." Id.
143. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65 n.76.
144. See id.; Note, supra note 7, at 673. The Buckley decision also suggests that de-
termining the satisfaction of the unrelatedness prong is not a narrow test. The campaign
expenditure regulation applied to all money, not to money expended by a particular viewpoint.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17. The fact that the Buckley Court concluded that a subject matter
regulation failed the unrelatedness prong undercuts any argument that unrelatedness is limited
to viewpoint discrimination. See Wright, supra note 51, at 1008 n.36.
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D. Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro
Like Buckley, the Court's decision in Linmark Associates v.
Township of Willingboro 145 is significant because of its treatment of
the unrelatedness prong. The township, purportedly to avoid the
flight of its white residents, passed an ordinance prohibiting the post-
ing of "for sale" signs on residential properties. 46 The challengers
wanted to place such signs on their property, and thus brought a
declaratory action against the township. 4 '
Although the township argued that the appropriate standard was
the incidental regulation standard, the Court eventually determined
that the regulation was a subject matter regulation, and accordingly,
applied the content regulation standard.'48 Under the more stringent
scrutiny, the Court indicated that, because the township had merely
assumed that the regulation would reduce panic selling, it was unable
to meet its burden of persuasion.' 49 In this regard, the township's
failure to provide any data regarding "white flight" and "panic sell-
ing" was fatal. 5 '
Although Linmark is not actually an incidental regulation deci-
sion,'' it sheds some light on the nature of the unrelatedness prong.
By rejecting the use of the incidental regulation test, the Court con-
cluded, at least implicitly, that regulating truthful speech for the pur-
pose of preventing white flight and panic selling was not unrelated to
the suppression of free expression.' 52
E. Brown v. Glines
The next landmark decision in the history of the incidental regu-
lation standard was Brown v. Glines.53 Justice Powell's majority
opinion provides some insight into the nature of the means prong of
the incidental regulation standard.
145. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
146. Id. at 87-88.
147. Id. at 86.
148. Id. at 96-97; see Note, The Effect of First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech
on Municipal Sign Ordinances, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 941, 949 (1978). In addition to arguing
for the applicability of the incidental regulation test, the township advanced other theories:
First, a definitional exception based on the commercial speech doctrine; and second, a TPM
regulation. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 92-94. The Court, however, primarily focused on
determining the appropriate standard. Id. at 94.
149. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 95-96.
150. Id. at 96.
151. The Court reserved any ruling as to whether the ordinance would survive the
incidental regulation test. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 94 n.7.
152. See id. at 96.
153. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
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Glines involved Air Force regulations requiring an officer to ob-
tain approval of the base commander before circulating any peti-
tions. 54 Glines, who was a captain in the Air Force Reserve, drafted
petitions to Congress, complaining about various Air Force grooming
standards. He was reassigned when he gave one of the petitions to
another military person without seeking prior approval.55 He
brought an action challenging the disciplinary reassignment, and pre-
vailed at the trial and appellate levels.' 56 The Supreme Court of the
United States, however, upheld the regulations. 151
Justice Powell applied the incidental regulation standard and
found that the regulations protected the substantial governmental
interest of military morale and readiness, which was "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." ' 8 With respect to the means prong,
the Court determined that the regulations did not control the use of
regular outlets of information, such as newsstands, on Air Force
bases. 5 9 Under these facts, the Court held that the Air Force regula-
tions were "no more than is reasonably necessary" to implement the
military goals. 160
The Glines decision sparked vigorous dissents regarding the ap-
plication of the incidental regulation standard. Justice Brennan, for
example, attacked the majority's analysis of the means test,' 6' con-
cluding that the Air Force regulations were an "excessive response"
to any military interest in morale and discipline. 62 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, Justice Stewart's dissent focused on the threshold issue of
unrelatedness.'63 Under his reasoning, this regulation could never
survive the unrelatedness prong because the preclearance regulation,
as applied in this case, was a purposeful, content restriction. 164 Under
these circumstances, the use of the incidental regulation test was
inappropriate. '65
Justice Stewart also raised the issue of whether the Court
examined the challenged regulation on its face or as applied to the
154. Id. at 351.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 351-52.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 354-55; see Comment, Brown v. Glines. Bowing to the "Shibboleth of Military
Necessity," 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 249, 258 (1980).
159. Glines, 444 U.S. at 355.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Comment, supra note 158, at 261-62, 262 n.74.
162. Glines, 444 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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facts of this particular case. As the Court demonstrated in Linmark,
mere facial neutrality is not sufficient to determine unrelatedness.'66
The Glines Court, however, insisted on limiting its analysis to the face
of the regulation. The problem, as Justice Stewart suggested, is that
almost any statute can be drafted in such a way as to appear facially
neutral.' 67 By ignoring the application of the statute, the Court failed
to examine the purposes underlying the particular regulation. 6 ' As
such, the Glines decision may mark the start of a degenerative phase
of the incidental regulation standard.
F. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service
Commission of New York
The unrelatedness issue was also critical in Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission of New York.' 6 9 In
direct contrast to Glines, however, the Court appeared to understand
the need to examine a regulation as it is applied.'
Consolidated Edison had placed written statements asserting
its favorable view towards nuclear energy in its billing envelope.'7 '
Upon an environmental group's request to place its own insert in the
next month's billing envelope in order to rebut Consolidated Edison's
statements, the Public Service Commission of New York banned all
such inserts.'72 After Consolidated Edison's unsuccessful appeals of
the commission's order, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed. 7 3
The unrelatedness issue was raised when the commission argued
that, "because the order '[was] only secondarily concerned with the
subject matter of Consolidated Edison communications,' " the appli-
166. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); see Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 n.76 (1976) (per curiam). The issue of facial neutrality appears to have
been settled as early as the O'Brien decision. After all, the statute in O'Brien was facially
neutral, but the Court examined its constitutionality as applied to O'Brien. See supra text
accompanying notes 91-111.
167. See Glines, 444 U.S. at 374-76 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 376. It is difficult to reconcile the Court's treatment of the unrelatedness
prong in Glines with either prior or subsequent decisions. Perhaps the only explanation is that
Glines was a decision involving the military. See Post, supra note 142, at 199-200; cf Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (free exercise claim).
169. 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The case also raised a corporate speech issue, but that issue will
not be addressed here. See id. at 533-35.
170. See id. at 540 n.9. Justice Powell wrote both the Consolidated Edison and Glines
opinions.
171. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 532.
172. Id. Although the point will be developed in the text, it should be noted that the
commission's order was a subject matter regulation.
173. Id. at 533.
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cable standard is the incidental regulation test."7 4 The Court rejected
this argument, specifically holding that, because the "bill insert prohi-
bition does not further a governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech,"' 75 the regulation failed the unrelatedness
prong. 176
The Court's opinion revealed several noteworthy points. First,
as in Buckley, the Consolidated Edison Court treated the unrelated-
ness prong as a threshold issue that must be satisfied before applying
the other prongs of the incidental regulation test.'77 In this fashion,
the Consolidated Edison decision demonstrated that, as of 1980, the
unrelatedness prong was a serious, nondeferential examination of gov-
ernmental purposes.
Second, the Court implicitly answered one of the unresolved
issues regarding the incidental regulation test: Whether a subject
matter regulation could satisfy the unrelatedness prong. Because the
restriction in Consolidated Edison was a complete ban on all billing
inserts, it would have to be considered a subject matter regulation,
rather than a more narrow viewpoint regulation.'17  For doctrinal
purposes, the Consolidated Edison decision demonstrates that the gov-
ernment cannot satisfy the unrelatedness prong merely by using a sub-
ject matter regulation rather than a viewpoint regulation. 1 9
Third, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the decision in
Consolidated Edison with that in Glines. Yet the Court continued to
use the incidental regulation standard, and in fact, began to apply it
outside of its earlier confines.
G. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. ' illustrates the Court's
application of the incidental regulation standard in a new context:
First amendment associational rights. In Claiborne, the Court over-
turned, on first amendment grounds, a judgment against black civil
174. Id. at 540 n.9 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 9 n.3). The commission also argued that
the restriction was merely a TPM regulation. See id. at 535.
175. Id. at 540 n.9. Because the ban imposed by the government in this case was a subject
matter regulation, the Court's decision should be recognized as undercutting any argument
that the unrelatedness prong is violated only by a viewpoint regulation. See id.
176. Id.
177. See id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 n.76 (1976) (per curiam).
178. Day, supra note 6, at 199 n.24; Stone, supra note 12, at 239-42. For a discussion of a
range of content discrimination, see Baker, supra note 12, at 959.
179. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537-40. None of the restrictions that the Court
subjected to the incidental regulation test, with the possible exception of the draft card
regulation in O'Brien, were readily identifiable as viewpoint regulations.
180. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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rights protesters., 81
In the late 1960's, black citizens in a Mississippi community
presented demands for racial equality to the all-white city officials.'1 2
When the demands were rejected, the black civil rights activists insti-
tuted an economic boycott of white merchants in the city. 83 The
merchants responded by suing in state court, claiming that the boy-
cott was illegal, and seeking to enjoin future boycotts.' 84 The trial
court rejected the defendants' first amendment associational freedom
assertion, and returned a verdict against the boycotters in the amount
of approximately $1/4 million. 8 5 Although the Supreme Court of
Mississippi upheld the judgment under a tort theory, 1 6 the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed.18 7
The Claiborne opinion, written by Justice Stevens, is long and
convoluted. For present purposes, the first step of the Court's analy-
sis was the determination that "the boycott clearly involved constitu-
tionally protected activity."'' 8 8  The Court then determined the
appropriate standard by which to evaluate the restriction imposed by
the state court tort judgment. 1 9  The Court stated that a
"[g]overnmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First
Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly defined
instances."' 90
It is clear, therefore, that the Claiborne Court applied the
O'Brien test. 191 It concluded that the state court's findings were "con-
stitutionally insufficient," and thus the restriction failed to satisfy the
means prong. 192 Finally, the Court held that "[t]o impose liablity
without a finding that the NAACP . . . ratified unlawful conduct
would impermissibly burden the rights of political association."' 93
One implication of Claiborne is that, with sufficiently detailed
findings of fact, a state court judgment of this magnitude could have
181. Id. at 934.
182. Id. at 889; see Note, supra note 7, at 659-60.
183. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 889.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 892-93.
186. Id. at 894.
187. Id. at 934.
188. Id. at 911.
189. Id. at 912.
190. Id.
191. See id.; Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott.: NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 413 n.20 (1984);
see also Note, The Political Boycott.: An Unprivileged Form of Expression, 1983 DUKE L.J.
1076, 1088 (arguing that the Claiborne Court misapplied the incidental regulation test).
192. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 933-34.
193. Id. at 931; see Harper, supra note 191, at 417.
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withstood constitutional muster. Yet the use of a state court judg-
ment as a weapon in a civil rights struggle is more analogous to a
congressional attempt to regulate political activities through regulat-
ing campaign contributions. Under the unrelatedness analysis in
Buckley,19 4 even a detailed factual record would constitute a regula-
tory effort integral to the content of the speech. Following the Buck-
ley analysis, any court arguably would direct its order towards the
speech itself. The Clairborne decision was curiously silent on that
issue, its silent treatment perhaps constituting more than "benign
neglect."
H. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
Although the Claiborne opinion never adequately addressed the
question of whether action by a state court constituted a regulation
unrelated to the suppression of expression, this issue was somewhat
clarified two years later in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.'95 In a
unanimous opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court rejected a
free speech challenge to the use of a protective order under Rule 26(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
196
Rhinehart was the leader of a small religious group. g'9 After the
defendant newspaper wrote articles about Rhinehart and the group's
other members, Rhinehart brought a defamation action in state
court. 19 When the newspaper undertook discovery of the religious
group's financial condition, Rhinehart sought a protective order
under the state version of Rule 26(c). 199 The trial court, after a hear-
ing, issued the order, prohibiting the dissemination of any discovered
financial information. 200 The newspaper, however, challenged the
nondissemination order."0 '
Applying the incidental regulation standard,2 °2 the Rhinehart
194. See supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
195. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
196. Id. at 29-37.
197. Id. at 22-23.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 24-25.
200. Id. at 27.
201. Id.
202. See Post, supra note 142, at 179-80 (The Rhinehart Court used the incidental reg-
ulation test from Procunier and O'Brien.). But see Note, Seattle Times v. Rhinehart" Making
"Good Cause" a Standard for Limits on Dissemination of Discovered Information, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 547, 567 (1986) (not recognizing the Court's use of the incidental regulation
standard).
Certain courts and commentators have concluded that Rhinehart did not involve first
amendment considerations. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d
Cir. 1986); Note, Seattle Times" What Effect on Discovery Sharing, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1055,
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Court first examined the "extent of the impairment" of the newspa-
per's free speech interest, and found that it was not sufficient to raise
the "specter of government censorship. ' 2°3 In this regard, the Court
emphasized that the newspaper could publish financial information
gathered from independent sources.2 °4
The Rhinehart Court essentially found that there was a substan-
tial governmental interest involved: Prevention of discovery abuse.2 °5
As to the means prong, the Court suggested that the protective order
was "no greater than necessary" because the issue regarding the scope
of the protective order had been decided at a hearing.20 6 Under these
circumstances, the Court held that the protective order did "not
offend the First Amendment. 20 7
The Rhinehart decision suggests that the use of an adversary
hearing alone satisfies the means prong of the incidental regulation
test.2 8  Regarding the unrelatedness prong, the Rhinehart Court
failed to use the degree of scrutiny used in Consolidated Edison.2 °9
This doctrinally quizzical aspect of Rhinehart pales, however, in com-
parison to the Court's analysis in two other decisions that year.
I. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent
The first of these two decisions was City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent. 2 ° The plaintiffs consisted of both the campaign committee
for, and sign service company affiliated with, Vincent, a political can-
didate. 21  As part of the campaign, the plaintiffs were attaching Vin-
cent's political posters to the utility poles in the election district. 21 2
1070. But see Worrell Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1223-24
n.4 (7th Cir. 1984). Yet the Rhinehart Court decided that, under the circumstances, the gov-
ernmental interests satisfied the incidental regulation standard, outweighing the extant free
speech interests. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35-36.
203. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32.
204. Id. at 34.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 24-25, 36-37.
207. Id. at 37. Justices Brennan and Marshall essentially agreed with the use of the in-
cidental regulation standard in this case. See id. at 37-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 36-37. This should not be surprising because such a hearing probably would
be the least restrictive alternative for achieving control over discovery. See supra text
accompanying note 14. Interestingly, one commentator concluded that the Rhinehart Court
abandoned the traditional means test. See Post, supra note 142, at 181-82.
209. See Post, supra note 142, at 181 n.65. Professor Post concluded that the Rhinehart
Court "was deeply misguided." Id. at 236. He argued convincingly that the protective order
should have failed the unrelatedness prong. See id. at 180-81. His further conclusion that the
facts would fail the means test, however, is less persuasive. See id. at 181-82.
210. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
211. Id. at 792-93.
212. Id.
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Pursuant to a Los Angeles city ordinance that banned the posting of
any signs on public utility poles, the city routinely removed Vincent's
political campaign posters, along with other signs.21 The plaintiffs
sued to enjoin the city's removal of these campaign posters. 21 4
The facts of Taxpayers for Vincent suggest that this case would
be an unlikely candidate for the application of the incidental regula-
tion test. No symbolic speech was involved, and the speech at issue
was political.2 5 The Court, however, relied primarily on O'Brien to
resolve the free speech issue posed by the city's sign removal policy.216
In applying the incidental regulation test, the Taxpayers for Vin-
cent Court determined that the ordinance was unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression because the trial court had found that the
ordinance applied to all candidates.2" 7 The Court's unprecedented
suggestion that mere evenhandedness can satisfy the unrelatedness
prong of the incidental regulation standard is patently inconsistent
with Consolidated Edison,218 and signifies an abrupt departure from
prior doctrine.2" 9
With regard to the other prongs of the incidental regulation test,
the Court determined that the governmental interest in avoiding vis-
ual clutter satisfied the substantial governmental interest prong,22 °
and that the means prong was satisfied because the ban on the polit-
ical campaign posters was part of a general ban on visual clutter.22'
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the ordinance survived the
incidental regulation test.2 22 The Taxpayers for Vincent Court, how-
213. Id. at 793.
214. Id.
215. See id. Political speech is frequently treated as though it were on the "highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980). The
Taxpayers for Vincent opinion, however, did not rely on such an analysis.
216. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05; see Note, supra note 50, at 229.
217. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 174-79.
219. See Day, supra note 6, at 212. Perhaps the most obvious sign of this departure is the
fact that Justice Stevens provided no authority for the proposition that the mere evenhanded
application of a regulation constitutes viewpoint neutrality. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. at 804.
220. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807.
221. Id. at 808-10.
222. Id. at 817. As an alternative basis for its decision, the Taxpayers for Vincent Court
held that, because the ban was applied evenhandedly, it also satisfied the TPM test. See id. at
808-10. The use of the TPM test and the incidental regulation test in these factual
circumstances marks an important doctrinal development because the Court explicitly relied
on the theory that the two tests were interchangeable in deciding a classic symbolic speech
case. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). In Clark, the
Court decided that, even if sleeping overnight were a protected form of expression, federal
government regulations of national parklands satisfied both the TPM and incidental regulation
tests. See id. at 298.
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ever, had departed radically from the traditional incidental regulation
standard.
J. Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence
That same year, the Court decided Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non- Violence.223  The Court's analysis in Clark began with the
observation that, although the National Park Service had pro-
mulgated regulations that limited overnight camping to "camp-
grounds, '22 4 neither LaFayette Park nor the Mall in Washington,
D.C. was designated as a campground. 22 Upon application, the
National Park Service issued the plaintiff, Community for Creative
Non-Violence (CCNV), a permit to conduct a demonstration at these
locations regarding the plight of the homeless. 226 Although the per-
mit allowed the erection of two symbolic tent sites, the National Park
Service specifically denied permission for the CCNV demonstrators to
sleep overnight.227
Under these facts, Clark appeared to be a classic symbolic speech
case, and therefore, a likely candidate for analysis under the inciden-
tal regulation test. Indeed, at one point, the Court applied the
O'Brien test.228 Yet, pursuant to the theory that the prohibition on
overnight sleeping was solely a regulation of the "manner" in which
the expressive activity could be conducted, the Court also examined
the anticamping regulation under the TPM test.2 29
Although the TPM test appears to be the basis of the Court's
rationale, Clark also is doctrinally significant for its application of the
incidental regulation standard. The Clark decision, concluding that
the "four-factor standard" of O'Brien was "little, if any, different
from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions, 230
provided new dimensions to the incidental regulation test. In fact, the
Clark Court may have created a hybrid test, applicable to all content-
neutral regulations. 23' The impact of this hybridization on the inci-
dental regulation standard may be profound. In particular, Clark
223. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
224. Id. at 290.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 291-92.
227. Id. at 292.
228. Id. at 298-99.
229. Id. at 293-98. One striking aspect of both Clark and Taxpayers for Vincent is the
addition of the narrowly tailored prong to the Heffron formulation of the TPM test. Id. at 293;
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808. By this process, both the TPM and incidental
regulation tests reached a high degree of similarity.
230. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
231. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 476 U.S. 41 (1986); Day, supra note 6, at 215.
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appears to reduce the protection traditionally afforded by the unrelat-
edness prong232 because, under the Clark hybrid test, the scrutiny of
the government's purposes would be relegated to merely a question of
whether the government is neutral as to viewpoint.
233
Some elaboration on this point, however, is necessary. In
O'Brien and other incidental regulation cases, the government had to
show that, even if the regulation had some impact on protected
expression, it had been adopted for purposes unrelated to the suppres-
sion of protected speech. 34 Moreover, mere viewpoint neutrality had
never traditionally constituted unrelatedness.235 The Clark decision,
however, appears to equate unrelatedness with viewpoint neutrality.
Through this dilution of the unreiatedness prong, the Clark Court has
drastically mitigated the level of protection afforded by the incidental
regulation test.236 Taken together, Taxpayers for Vincent and Clark
may strip the incidental regulation test of its primary doctrinal signifi-
cance: The unrelatedness inquiry.
K. Wayte v. United States
One year after Clark, the Court decided Wayte v. United
States,237 a contemporary version of O'Brien. After legislative action
and Executive orders reestablished registration with the Selective Ser-
vice System, the defendant, Wayte, refused to register.238 During this
time, the Selective Service had a "policy of passive enforcement.
239
Pursuant to its policy, the Selective Service sent Wayte a letter urging
him to register.24° Rather than respond, Wayte wrote letters to the
232. See Day, supra note 6, at 222.
233. See id. at 223.
234. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
235. See generally Day, supra note 6, at 223.
236. For a discussion of the reduction of protection, see Schauer, supra note 1, at 787-88;
Stone, supra note 2, at 110; and Note, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence: The
Demise of First Amendment Protection for Symbolic Expression?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1371,
1398-99 (1985).
237. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
238. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 600-01. The Military Selective Service Act provides:
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other
male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the
first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and
place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of
the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
50 U.S.C. § 453(a) (1982).
239. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 601.
240. Id. at 601-02.
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President, stating his intent not to register.241 Wayte's letters, along
with similar protest letters, were placed in a special file of the Selec-
tive Service. 242 The Selective Service eventually referred 286 names,
including Wayte's, to the Department of Justice for further action. 43
With respect to those names, the Department established a "beg" pol-
icy under which it urged nonregistrants to comply. 244 The federal
government also provided a grace period.245 Wayte, however, never
registered, and eventually was indicted.246 As of the date of his trial,
only thirteen of the 286 people had been indicted.247
After disposing of Wayte's challenge to the government's
enforcement policy on selective prosecution grounds, 248 the Court
addressed Wayte's first amendment challenge.249 Wayte asserted that
the selective enforcement policy violated both his right to free speech
and his right to petition 250 because, although the policy "did not
overtly punish protected speech as such, it inevitably created a con-
tent-based regulatory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-
based impact on non-registrants."' 25 ' The Court rejected Wayte's con-
tention by applying the incidental regulation standard. 2
The Wayte Court found neither the first nor third prongs to be in
dispute.253  Thus, the Court applied only the second and fourth
prongs of the test.254 The Court first concluded that the governmental
interests in national security, prosecutorial efficiency, and the deter-
rence of nonregistration were sufficient to satisfy the second prong.2 5
The Court then determined that the government's means did not
impose any "special burden" on the defendant, emphasizing that the
241. Id. at 601.
242. id.
243. Id. at 602.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 603.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 604 n.3. The Selective Service estimated that, as of the time of Wayte's in-
dictment, approximately 674,000 men had failed to register. See id. at 604 n.4. Although
some of these failures may have been the result of oversight or ignorance, the numbers alone
suggest that a serious problem existed for the Selective Service. See Note, Constitutional Law.
The Conflict of First Amendment Rights and the Motive Requirement in Selective Enforcement
Cases, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 498, 499 (1986).
248. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-10. The Court utilized an equal protection analysis. Id. at
608.
249. Id. at 610.
250. Id. at 610 n.l 1. The Court subjected both challenges to a free speech analysis. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 611-13.
253. Id. at 611.
254. See id. at 611-13.
255. Id.
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"passive enforcement policy" was "only an interim enforcement. ' 256
Under these circumstances, because the government could not locate
most nonregistrants, 2 7 the Court concluded that the "policy ... [met]
the final requirement of the O'Brien test. 258
In some ways, Wayte was an uncomplicated case. In light of the
O'Brien decision, there was little doubt that the government could
satisfy the substantiality prong. The Wayte Court's analysis of the
means prong, however, was disturbing. 259 From a doctrinal perspec-
tive, the Wayte Court ignored the fact that the government's decision
to prosecute was based exclusively on passive enforcement.26° In
effect, the Court indicated that the means subtest was not particularly
rigorous.261 In this regard, the Wayte decision foreshadowed the
Court's decision in United States v. Albertini.262
L. United States v. Albertini
The Court subsequently clarified the problematic analysis in
Wayte of the means prong in the 1985 decision of United States v.
Albertini.263 In 1972, Albertini was convicted of "conspiracy to injure
Government property" upon obtaining and destroying secret Air
Force documents.264 At that time, he received a "bar letter," forbid-
ding him to enter the base without the written permission of the base
commander.265
In 1981, after the announcement of an open house at an Air
Force base, Albertini and some friends reentered the base without
written permission 266 in order to undertake a "peaceful demonstration
criticizing the nuclear arms race. '267 He unfurled a banner and dis-
tributed leaflets without disrupting any activities.268 He was con-
victed, however, of violating a federal statute 269 that makes it




260. See Shane, Equal Protection, Free Speech, and the Selective Prosecution of Draft
Nonregistrants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 359, 360 (1987).
261. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 613; Shane, supra note 260, at 385. Although the Wayte Court
did not address the issue with clarity, it implied that the burden of persuasion may rest on the
challenger. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 613-14.
262. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 677.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 678.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 679. Albertini was prosecuted and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982). Id.
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unlawful to reenter a base after having been barred. 270 Although the
Ninth Circuit reversed Albertini's conviction on free speech grounds,
the Supreme Court of the United States rejected Albertini's argument,
and reversed.27'
The Albertini Court clearly applied the incidental regulation
standard.272 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, recognized
that the "[a]pplication of a facially neutral regulation that incidentally
burdens speech satisfies the First Amendment" if it satisfies the
O'Brien standard.273 With respect to the incidental regulation stan-
dard, Albertini's arguments focused primarily on the means prong.
He asserted that the governmental interests at the military base could
be served equally by security methods and the existence of punish-
ment for the destruction of property.274 In essence, Albertini argued
that the government had less intrusive means available.275
Although the Court agreed that there were less intrusive alterna-
tives, it asserted that the not greater than necessary prong was not the
equivalent of a least restrictive alternative analysis.276 The Court held
that the means prong was satisfied "so long as the neutral regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation. 277
The Albertini Court did not explain its conclusion that the not
greater than necessary prong was not the equivalent of a least restric-
tive alternative analysis. The Court's drastic reduction of the level of
protection afforded by the not greater than necessary prong, however,
is doctrinally significant. The Court's interpretation of this prong
through the perspective of the decisionmaker rather than the chal-
lenger amounts to nothing more than a rational basis test.278 After
Albertini and Wayte, it appears that the means prong is satisfied as
long as the governmental regulation rationally pursues the asserted
governmental interest.
270. Id. at 677.
271. Id. at 677, 679, 687. On the government's appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, Albertini urged the Court to affirm on the grounds that those persons with bar letters
had been allowed to attend open houses on other bases, enforcement was not essential to
security, and the government's interests were served by both security measures at the open
house and statutes that punish misconduct. Id. at 688.
272. Id. at 687-88.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 688.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 688-89.
277. Id. at 689.
278. See id.; Stone, supra note 2, at I10-11.
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M. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.
One of the last decisions by the Burger Court arguably involved
the incidental regulation standard. Indeed, the facts in Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc.2 79 appeared to present a classic incidental regula-
tion case. The defendants ran an adult book store in upstate New
York.28° After the county sheriff's undercover investigation revealed
illicit sexual activities and solicitation for prostitution on the premises
of the book store, the district attorney filed a civil action under a red
light abatement statute to close the premises for one year.28'
The defendants denied any allegations and moved for partial
summary judgment, which the trial court denied.282 Although the
court ordered the book store to be closed for one year, and the appel-
late court affirmed,283 the Court of Appeals of New York reversed the
decision on first amendment grounds.284 In an opinion authored by
Chief Justice Burger, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed, upholding the application of the statute.2 85
In light of Wayte and Albertini, the result may not have been a
surprise, but the Cloud Books Court's analysis had a novel twist. The
Court determined that the incidental regulation test was not even
implicated because the sexual activity at the book store involved
"absolutely no element of protected expression. "286 The Court rea-
soned that, because the state sought only to eliminate the illicit sexual
activities, the incidental regulation standard was simply not applica-
ble.2 87 In other words, without the presence of protected expression,
only the rational basis standard applied.
For purposes of this article, two potential readings of Cloud
Books exist. First, one could read Chief Justice Burger's opinion as
suggesting that the incidental regulation test does not exist.2 88 The
problem with this interpretation, however, is that merely because the
279. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986). For a discussion of Cloud Books, see Note, The Content Dis-
tinction and Freedom of Expression: Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 893
(1987).
280. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3173.
281. Id. at 3173-74. For a discussion of state court cases that have analyzed similar
statutes, see Note, supra note 279, at 903-07, 911-12.
282. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3174.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 3178.
286. Id. at 3176-77; see Note, supra note 279, at 908 (stating that the Cloud Books Court
applied a lower scrutiny "than that which the O'Brien standard demands").
287. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3178.
288. Cf Stone, supra note 2, at 110 (questioning whether Cloud Books "exhaust[ed] the
circumstances in which the Court will review a law that has only an incidental effect on free
expression"). See generally Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: " 'Twas
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government based its order on the unprotected activity does not mean
that the Court should remove all protection. Under a traditional inci-
dental regulation analysis, satisfaction of the unrelatedness prong
does not exempt the governmental regulation from application of the
other prongs of the test.2 9  The unrelatedness prong is only the
threshold-not the entire test.29 °
Second, Cloud Books might be read as indicating that the Court
misapplied the incidental regulation standard. As Justice Blackmun
properly observed in his dissent, the one-year closure statute had "a
severe and unnecessary impact on the First Amendment rights of
booksellers ' 29 ' and should have failed the incidental regulation stan-
dard because it was "not narrowly tailored. ' 292  Although Cloud
Books may be reconciled with the traditional incidental regulation
analysis under this second alternative, other recent decisions suggest
that the first reading might be more accurate. A review of these deci-
sions indicates that the Cloud Books Court may have turned the
retreat of the incidental regulation doctrine into a rout.
N. Turner v. Safley
The case of Turner v. Safley2 9 3 is important because it embodies a
revision of the Procunier decision.2 94 In Safley, prison inmates chal-
lenged a Missouri prison regulation that governed correspondence
between inmates at different institutions.295 Such correspondence was
permitted only if the authorities at each prison agreed. 296 Both the
district and appellate courts viewed the regulation as a content regula-
tion and applied a strict scrutiny analysis.2 97 The Supreme Court of
the United States, however, applied a lower standard and reversed.298
Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 2 (discussion of later opinions of the Burger Court).
289. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 355 (1980); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
290. See Note, supra note 7, at 684-85. Justice Blackmun's dissent echoed the traditional
incidental regulation doctrine by asserting that the free speech clause "protects against all laws
... [and] not just those specifically directed at expressive activity." Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at
3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
291. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3181 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 3180.
293. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
294. For a discussion of Procunier, see supra text accompanying notes 113-23.
295. See Safley, 107 S. Ct. at 2257-58. The inmates also challenged a regulation relating to
inmate marriages. Id. at 2257. This article, however, does not address this aspect of Safley.
296. Id. at 2258. The regulation exempted correspondence between immediate family
members, and correspondence related to legal matters from this requirement. Id.
297. Id. at 2258-59.
298. Id. at 2261-64.
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Although the Court did not rely explicitly on the incidental regulation
doctrine, it held that "a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in
determining the constitutionality of the prison rules." '29 9 Through
rather bold definitional balancing, the Court suggested that communi-
cation among prisoners was simply not protected as a free speech
interest.3°
The Safley majority reread Procunier as an "audience rights"
case.310 In Safley, the prisoners apparently did not assert that the reg-
ulation had any impact on nonprisoner protected interests. Because
all communication was between inmates, the Court seemingly rejected
the notion that protected expression was at stake, maintaining that all
that was necessary was that the regulation be "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. '30 2
Safley is doctrinally significant primarily because it provides
some insight into what the Court may have sought to accomplish in
Cloud Books. The Court's approach in Safley indicates that Cloud
Books may have been an attempt to remove, through some ad hoc
process, certain adult entertainment from protected status. Although
the Cloud Books Court was unable to muster a majority for a pogrom
against pornography, a majority of the Justices in Safley were willing
to take a blanket approach with respect to prisoners' rights.30 3
Although the reasoning in Safley possibly could have profound
implications, a discussion of definitional balancing is beyond the
scope of this article. For doctrinal purposes, the tragedy of Safley is
not so much the decision itself, but the dicta, which, as in Albertini,
confuses content-neutrality with unrelatedness.3 °4 Such language
is inconsistent with the traditional analysis of the unrelatedness
prong. 30 5
IV. THE DOCTRINAL STATUS OF THE INCIDENTAL
REGULATION TEST
The incidental regulation doctrine has had, during its twenty-
year life span, a colorful and dynamic history. Although the standard
originated in the context of symbolic speech, the Court has broadened
299. Id. at 2257.
300. Id. at 2263-64. Definitional balancing is, of course, a technique that the Court has
employed regularly. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
301. Id. at 2260.
302. Id. at 2261.
303. See id. at 2259-62.
304. See id. at 2262-64; United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 131-52.
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its application dramatically." 6 Moreover, with the explicit addition
of a means prong to the TPM test, the Court apparently has closely
aligned the previously independent free speech tests.3 °7 These are sig-
nificant-if not doctrinally revolutionary-developments.
An understanding of these events requires an appreciation of the
status of the elements of the test originally announced in the O'Brien
decision. Under these circumstances, the balance of this article will
focus on the status of the various elements of the incidental regulation
test, including the allocation of the burden of persuasion.
A. The Burden of Persuasion
One salient feature of free speech jurisprudence is that, in the
face of a colorable free speech claim, the normal presumption of con-
stitutionality is suspended, and the burden of persuasion rests with
the governmental regulators.308 Even outside the area of content reg-
ulation, it is generally understood that speech normally has protection
with respect to the burden of persuasion.3"9 Although little scholar-
ship exists regarding the role of the burden of persuasion in the inci-
dental regulation standard,31 0 it is obviously significant. To the extent
that the elements of the test may lack clarity, the burden of persua-
sion may be determinative of the outcome in a particular decision. 1
A review of the history of the standard indicates that the burden
rests with the government.3 12 In contrast to decisions on the content-
based track or under the TPM standard, however, the burden of per-
suasion with regard to the application of the incidental regulation test
does not appear to have had any serious consequences because of the
Court's interpretation of the test. As will be discussed below, the
Court has decreased the level of protection afforded by the various
substantive elements of the test. Because the Court has made each
element relatively easy for the government to fulfill, there has been no
need to shift the burden.3 13
306. See supra text accompanying notes 153-68.
307. See Day, supra note 6, at 222.
308. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583 n.6
(1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
309. See Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-96.
310. Cf. Stone, supra note 2, at 108 (stating that the Court presumes that laws that have an
incidental effect do not raise a first amendment issue).
311. See Note, supra note 108, at 474.
312. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (citing O'Brien for
the proposition that "the burden was upon [the government] to justify its decision").
313. The Court may use the burden of persuasion as an alternative basis for its decision.
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B. Within the Constitutional Power of the Government
This part of the incidental regulation test3" 4 is perhaps the easiest
to analyze. It represents the normal due process standard that is
applicable in any constitutional case.31 5  The incidental regulation
decisions have never depended on this question because, in every
instance, the government is able to identify some legitimate area of
governmental power. Accordingly, unless the Court were to abandon
the incidental regulation standard altogether, this prong of the test
should remain dormant.
C. The Unrelatedness Prong
The unrelatedness prong is a unique aspect of the incidental reg-
ulation test; no other test features an analogous prong. The history of
the Court's interpretation of the unrelatedness prong suggests two
conclusions. First, this prong is the starting point for the rest of the
test. Even though the O'Brien Court listed this as the third prong of
the standard,31 6 commentators have recognized, from a very early
point, that it was actually the initial inquiry.3" 7 In recent decisions,
moreover, the Court has repeatedly treated this prong as the thresh-
old subtest.31 8
Second, the unrelatedness prong is an examination of the purpose
underlying the regulation. 31 9 This prong determines whether the gov-
ernment sought to impose a purposeful regulation on protected
speech interests.3"' In assessing this purpose, the Court looks to the
effect of the regulation3 2' and the degree of impact.322
See Note, supra note 108, at 474 n.52. This observation of the Court's practice, along with the
other observations noted in the text, are offered as descriptions of the current state of the
incidental regulation test. They do not represent the author's view as to how the standard
should be applied.
314. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 ("within the constitutional power").
315. One commentator has stated that the first element of the O'Brien test "is superfluous in
light of what is normally designated criterion." Recent Development, Free Speech and Public
Utilities. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 44 ALB. L. REV. 515, 523
n.50 (1980).
316. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
317. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 1484.
318. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 530, 540 n.9 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 n.76 (1976) (per curiam).
319. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540 n.9.
320. See id.; Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 81 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Day, supra note 6, at 210.
321. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982).
322. See Stone, supra note 2, at 81-86. At least until recent times, arguments regarding so-
called "secondary effects" have not sidetracked the Court. See City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986); Stone, supra note 2, at 106 n.243; Leading Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 100, 200 (1986) ("contrived secondary effects").
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In sum, the unrelatedness prong is a threshold examination of
the governmental purpose underlying the restriction. Unless the gov-
ernment establishes that its regulation advances purposes unrelated to
the suppression of expression, the Court's analysis will not reach the
other prongs of the incidental regulation test.
D. The Substantive Quality of the Governmental Interest
After the threshold of unrelatedness is satisfied, the next subtest
is the substantial governmental interest prong. Initially, there may
have been some confusion about the requirements of this prong. The
uncertainty existed because the governmental interests in O'Brien
probably could have been classified as compelling.3 23 Although the
O'Brien decision did not clarify this issue, recent decisions have con-
cluded that this prong does not require much more than a legitimate
governmental interest.3 24
In particular, the Rhinehart decision established that the sub-
stantial governmental interest prong was satisfied by a concern about
discovery abuse in civil cases.3 25 The Wayte decision also may clarify
the nature of the subtest because the military preparedness interest in
Wayte involved a peacetime posture.3 26 Neither peacetime prepared-
ness nor prevention of discovery abuse are interests that confidently
could be classified as compelling governmental interests.
For purposes of the incidental regulation standard, however, the
governmental interest does not have to rise to the compelling level
applicable to strict scrutiny. The incidental regulation decisions
demonstrate that the government can satisfy this prong merely
through proof of the existence of some governmental concern.327
E. The Means Prong
Although the Court recognized the significance of the means-or
not greater than necessary-prong at an early point,3 21 the prong has
proved to be one of the most elusive, yet pivotal, aspects of the inci-
dental regulation standard. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the fol-
323. For a discussion of these interests, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-82
(1968).
324. See Stone, supra note 2, at 51 (As long as the governmental interest is "not
imaginary," it can satisfy the substantiality prong.).
325. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984).
326. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 612 (1985).
327. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 158, 255; see also Stone, supra note 2, at 51
(characterizing a substantial interest as one that "has substance" rather than one that is
"important").
328. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
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lowing comparison. In Procunier, although the government was able
to advance the important interest of prison safety, the Court invali-
dated the regulations on the grounds that they failed to meet the
means prong.329 Yet, as evidenced in the decisions of Wayte and
Albertini, the Court has reduced the means scrutiny to the rational
basis level.33° At present, the only regulation that would not satisfy
the means test would be a complete ban.33 1
The Court's analysis in Safley best illustrates this conclusion.
When faced with a regulation on prisoner correspondence arguably
unconstitutional under Procunier, the Safley Court jettisoned the use
of the incidental regulation test altogether.332 Apparently recognizing
that a complete ban on inmate-to-inmate correspondence would not
survive the means prong of the incidental regulation standard, the
Court simply used a rational basis standard. 333
As Professor Baker has noted, a means test is "an aid in charac-
terizing the purpose of the law."'3 34 The Court apparently has recog-
nized this in the incidental regulation cases.335 Presently, the flaccid
nature of the Court's means scrutiny suggests that the incidental regu-
lation test may have devolved into a mere rational basis inquiry. 336
V. CONCLUSION
As Dean Stone has recently stated: "The test of a test is ... its
application. ' 337  To the extent that the incidental regulation test can
be evaluated by its application, it largely has failed its traditional pur-
poses. The failure did not occur overnight, but only as a result of
incremental chipping over the course of twenty years.
Although the constitutional power prong was never an obstacle
to governmental regulation, the other elements of the standard
seemed, in the early years, to provide some degree of judicial scrutiny.
329. Id. at 415.
330. See Harper, supra note 191, at 414; Schauer, supra note 1, at 787; supra text
accompanying notes 259-78.
331. Cf Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2568,
2572 (1987) (regulation prohibiting all protected expression by creating a "First Amendment
Free Zone" violated the first amendment because it was overly broad).
332. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2264 (1987).
333. See id. at 2257, 2264. For a discussion of Safley, see supra text accompanying notes
294-306.
334. Baker, supra note 12, at 963 n.59. Although Professor Baker was addressing the TPM
standard, his observation has general applicability to any of the tests employed by the Court.
335. See supra notes 237-78 and accompanying text; see also Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 & n. 17 (1985) (examination of the means is a test of the
government's sincerity).
336. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688 (1985); Stone, supra note 2, at 51.
337. Stone, supra note 2, at 52.
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Over the years, however, the level of scrutiny has deteriorated. The
substantiality prong, for example, has devolved into a lower level of
scrutiny.33 Moreover, after Wayte and Albertini, the means prong
has been reduced to a rational basis test.3
39
In light of the lowered scrutiny of the various prongs, the only
protective prong in the incidental regulation test may be the unrelat-
edness prong. Yet, to the extent that the Court in Taxpayers for Vin-
cent and Clark has transformed the prong into a content-neutral
subtest, the unrelatedness prong may also have lost its historic
significance.3 40
An obvious danger in the Court's recent reduction of the inciden-
tal regulation test to a rational basis review is that the Court will now
place content regulations on the content-neutral track.34' There,
under a rational basis analysis, these regulations will be routinely
upheld.142 Under these circumstances, there can be little doubt that
the Court's recent decisions regarding the incidental regulation doc-
trine represent a regressive approach to the protection traditionally
afforded free speech interests.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 324-27.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 330-36.
340. See Day, supra note 6, at 223; supra text accompanying notes 218-36.
341. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., v. Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2981
(1987) (content regulation treated as "incidental to the primary congressional purpose," and
tested under O'Brien); Day, supra note 6, at 219 n.159.
342. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47-50 (1986) (regulation that was
content-based on its face was tested by TPM standard); Stone, supra note 2, at 79.
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